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COMMENT
LEGALITY OF AGREEMENTS TO PAY INTEREST
ON INTEREST IN NEW YORK
"That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which
grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience be found to
serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds
that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society.... I
Nevertheless it should be noted in connection with the aforementioned guide
for a judicial prerogative that, while the aims expressed therein may be laudable, the results are not always their heirs. The adherence of the courts to
the principle of stare decisis is often too compelling to permit the complete
abandonment of a particular judicial precedent and thus the courts are inclined
to resort to fine distinctions and qualifications which at the time ameliorate,
but, when viewed in retrospect, often make for an incongruous maze. Thus while
the old rule remains, the exceptions to it increase and the ensuing inconsistencies multiply.2 To such a situation, one might well append the late Chief
Justice Holmes' classic remark, "The life of the law has not been logic. .. 3
No better manifestation of this judicial pattern can be found than in the
case of the law of New York which considers invalid agreements to pay interest on interest.4 The attempts of the New York courts to exercise the judicial
prerogative previously alluded to, especially with reference to interest coupons,
has produced anomalies and inconsistencies which form the raison d'etre of
this comment.
1. Wheeler, J. in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 AtI. 883 (1915); quoted
with approval in CA.Dozo, NATIRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 151, as expressing
the ". . . tone and temper in which problems should be met."
2. While recognizing the need for judicial sensitivity to sociological and economic
changes, the late Justice Cardozo issues with his usual clarity and eloquence a caveat:
"The rule that functions well produces a title deed to recognition. Only in determining
how it functions we must not view it too narrowly. We must not sacrifice the general
to the particular. We must not throw to the winds the advantages of consistency and
uniformity to do justice in the instance." CARDozo, NATURE OF T=E JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921) 103.
3.

HOLimS, THE Co

ON LAW (1881)

1.

4. The confusion apparent in the New York law on this subject has had its repercussions in the federal courts which have been called on to apply the New York Law.
The resultant conflict bears eloquent testimony to the uncertainty in the New York Law.
Compare Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.
N. Y. 1935) with Transbel Investment Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. N. Y. 1940).
For a review of some of these divergent Federal cases which have considered the policy
of New York with reference to the right of a creditor to collect interest on interest, see
McNiece, The Interest on Interest Rule in New York (1946) 20 ST. JoIin's L. REV. 71.
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Rationale of the New York Law
The New York rule which invalidates agreements to pay interest on interest
exists because interest on interest ".. . may serve as a temptation to negligence
on the part of the creditor and a snare to the debtor, and prove in -the end
oppressive, and even ruinous." 5 It is upon such an apparently over-paternalistic and unrealistic rationale that the New York view is based. While this
New York rule is followed in some jurisdictions, 6 there is considerable and
substantial 7authority in other jurisdictions sustaining the validity of such
agreements.

It might be well to point out in this connection that the expressions "compound interest" and "interest on interest" are used interchangeably by the
New York courts in their discussions of the subject.8 Such identity is natural
for the difference is merely one of quantity rather than of quality.0 Interest
on interest is the interest paid on the interest due upon the original sum.
Compound interest 0 is the interest paid when the unpaid interest due is added
5. Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876). It is an interesting circumstance that none
of the cases recognizing this general rule were directly concerned with its application. The
cases uniformly cited for the proposition that agreements to pay interest on interest are
invalid, involved agreements made after the interest had accrued. For example, see Young
v. Hill, supra; Van Benschooten v. Lawson, 6 Johns Ch. 313 N. Y. (1822). As will be
shown hereafter such agreements, covering past due interest have from the earliest times
been treated as an exception not covered by the general rule.
6. See for example Bowman v. Neeley, 137 Ill. 443, 27 N. E. 758 (1891); Gay v.
Berkey, 137 Mich. 658, 100 N. W. 920 (1904); Cox v. Smith, 1 Nev. 161 (1865).
7. Greer v. Greer, 56 Ariz. 394, 108 P. (2d) 389 (1940); Honey v. Edmison, 3 Dak.
449, 22 N. W. 594 (1884); Morgan v. Mortgage Disc. Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589
(1930); Bradley v. Merrill, 91 Me. 340, 40 Atl. 132 (1898); Hale v. Hale, 1 Coldw. 333
(Tenn. 1860); Shealy v. Cappelmann, 145 S. C. 408, 143 S. E. 178 (1928).
8. The court points this out in In Re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 63 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D.
Minn. 1945). However, cf. Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876), in which the court, appearing to note a distinction, said at 174: "An agreement to pay simple interest upon the several
installments of interest as they become due and a computation based upon such an agreement,... might not be unreasonable or inequitable." A recent federal case, relying for the
most part on the aforementioned quotation from Young v. Hill, supra, differentiated between interest on interest and compound interest, and held that an allowance of interest on
tnpaid accrued interest was not contrary to New York public policy. In Re Realty
Associates Securities Corporation, 66 F. Supp. 416 (E. D. N. Y. 1946). This decision
accentuates further the sharp conflict already evident in the federal cases which have
attempted to interpret the New York law on this subject. See note 4 supra.
9. As Judge Clancy so aptly observed in Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396,
398 (S.D. N. Y. 1940).
10. Under the broad plenary power given to the Banking Board

"...

to prescribe

from time to time: (1) the rates of interest which may be paid on deposits with any
banking organization" (N. Y. BANxINo LAW § 14 (h)), commercial banks, trust companies, private bankers and industrial banks have been authorized by General Regulation
No. 3 of the New York State Banking Board to compound interest on deposits. It should
be noted however that the agreements to pay interest by these institutions normally contain
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to the principal and the resulting sum is the basis for the next computation."
Neither compound interest nor interest on interest can rightfully be considered usurious. 12 By definition usury is ".

.

. the taking of more interest for

the use of money than the law allows.' 1 3 In either the case of compound
interest or interest on interest, the debtor may pay his debt when due and
thus avoid the contract which obliges him to pay the additional interest so
that there is in such cases no absolute contract for the payment of more than
14
legal interest.
a provision whereby the banking organization may, upon notice change the interest rate.
In this way these banking organizations protect themselves from the possible adverse
effects of commitments to compound interest on deposits. It may also be apposite to .note
that the so-called "compound interest" paid by mutual savings banks on depositors'
accounts is not really interest at all but rather is more in the nature of dividends paid
to the depositors who are considered to be actually the beneficial owners of the corporate
estate. See Huntington v. Savings Bank, 96 U. S. 388, 394 (1877); NEw YORK BANKno
LAW §§ 244, 245. Thus it has been succinctly noted that "Whether the profits of a savings
bank, when distributed be called 'interest' or 'dividends' is purely a question of definition. As a matter of fact, the money distributed among the depositors is the profit on
their investment of their own money, and is in all material respects similar to the dividends
paid to the shareholders of an ordinary corporation." 1 MORAWETZ, PIVATE CORPORATONS
§ 391 n. 2.
11. The important difference in the two forms of calculation is that in "interest on
interest" the accrued interest is not combined with the principal but each installment of
interest itself becomes a new principal which bears simple interest, and no interest is
allowed on the interest on the interest. A simple mathematical calculation may serve to
illustrate this latter point more concretely: let us assume a $1000 note payable with
annual interest at 6%. At the end of 5 years, the amount due if "compound interest"
were computed would be $1338.23 while if "interest on interest" were computed, it would
be $1336. The following chart illustrates the progressive difference which, as is evident,
becomes slightly larger as time elapses.
TOTAL Aao

TTDuE (nearest hundredth)
co10oUND INTEREST

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

Yr.
Yr.
Yr.
Yr.
Yr.

$$1060.00
1123.60
1191.02
1262.48
1338.23

INTEREST ON INTEREST

$1060.00
1123.60
1190.80
1261.60
1336.00

12. At early common law usury was originally synonymous with interest. Usury denoted the money received for the use of other money and as such was universally condemned by philosophers and theologians as against the laws of God and morality and
by economists on the now discredited theory that money was barren and unproductive
and could not beget money. The demands of a mercantile economy however, gradually.
compelled the acceptance of the concept of interest as we know it today. 2 BL. CoICK.
454. For an excellent historical and analytical treatment of the theological objections to
the taking of interest for money lent see 15 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 237 (Usury).
13. 3 PARSONS, LAW Or CONTRACTS (9th ed. 1904) 107. For the N. Y. statutory definition of Usury see N. Y. GEN. BusIN ss LAW §§ 370, 371.
14. The essence of a usurious contract lies in the absolute reservation of interest beyond
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Anomalies and Inconsistencies in the New York Law
The New York rule invalidating agreements to pay interest on interest is
easy to state: ".

.

. a promise to pay interest upon interest is void if made at

a time before simple interest has accrued."' 1 However the search for concrete
applications of the rule becomes involved in the quagmire of exception and
qualification which a judiciary faced with the necessity of applying an outmoded and unreasonable rule has engrafted upon it. Thus from the earliest
times16 an agreement to pay interest on interest, on interest already due, as
distinguished from interest to become due, was valid if supported by a sufficient
consideration. In this type of transaction the promise by the debtor to pay
interest on the defaulted interest is entirely dependent upon and supported
by the promise on the part of the creditor to forbear and extend the time for
payment.' 7 It would appear that the policy which condemns agreements made
before the interest is due does not fully apply to these situations where the
agreement is made after the interest has fallen due. While it may be true that,
in a sense, the continuation of the debt (now increased by the addition of the
already due interest) serves as a temptation to the creditor to continue the
debtor-creditor relationship, it cannot be said that the new arrangement constitutes a snare to the debtor for its occurrence must fully awaken him to the
extent of his obligation. The possibility of interminable interest accumulations
which gave rise to the general rule finds no place in this arrangement since
the debt is limited to an ascertainable amount until the debtor is again awakened by a new agreement.
That the law on even this elemental exception, which permits interest on
already accrued interest, is beclouded by inconsistencies can be readily ascertained by an examination of a few New York cases. Thus at a very early
date in the case of Van Bensckooten v. Lawson'8 the court made the distinction
the legal rate, and if there is no certain agreement to pay excessive interest it is not
usurious. In re Becktoldt's Estate, 159 Misc. 725, 289 N. Y. Supp. 838 (Surr. Ct. 1936);
Hartley v. Eagle Ins. Co., 222 N. Y. 178, 118 N. E. 178 (1918);, Home Insurance Co. v.
Dun'-am, 33 Hun 415 (N. Y. 1884); Sumner v. The People, 29 N. Y. 337 (1864).
15. Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 511, 115 N. E. 846 (1916).
Contra: Hale v. Hale, 1 Coldw. 233 (Tenn. 1860), in which the court, after reviewing
the conflicting decisions on the question said: "If it be assumed that it was stipulated
in the original contract that the interest should be compounded, if not punctually paid,
we hold that there is nothing illegal or immoral, or contrary to policy in such an agreement. The interest is both legally and equitably due at the expiration of the period
limited for its payment .... "
16. For a complete review of the current of early English decisions with especial
reference to the early exceptions and limitations by which the general rule was attended
see Conn. v. Jackson, 1 Johns Ch. 13 (N. Y. 1814).
17, Thus in Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876), the court in discussing the necessity
for the promise to forbear as the consideration for an expressed or implied promise to
pay compound interest stated at 105: "It is the agreement to forbear for a time in the
future that gives vitality to the promise."
18. 6 Johns Ch. 313 (N. Y. 1822).

1946]

COMMENT

between a retrospective agreement and one prospective in holding that an
agreement to allow interest retroactively for the year preceding on the interest
which was due for that year could not be permitted since the retrospective
effect of such an agreement ". . leads to oppression."' 9 Inferentially the court
indicated that an agreement prospective in its operation, as that the interest
due and payable shall carry interest thereafter, would be valid.
This dichotomy is achieved without any reference to the ,necessity of a
sufficient consideration and is based solely on the public policy which is thought
to be involved. 20 In fact much of the confusion in the application, of the rule
that agreements to pay interest on interest then due are valid results from a
failure on the part of the courts to apprehend correctly the part which consideration plays. This becomes clear when we consider what the courts have
said in this regard. In the case of Mowry v. Bishop2l the court stated: ."I
conclude therefore that the moral obligation of the debtor to make the usual
remuneration for the loss of interest which the creditor sustains by the nonfulfillment of his contract in such a case, is a sufficient consideration to support
a subsequent agreement in writing to pay the interest on such arrears of
interest. . .

."

Similarly, in the case of Guernsey v. Rexford,22 although an

agreement to pay compound interest so far as it stipulated to pay interest
from the date of the agreement on the amount of interest then due and unpaid
was declared valid, the reported facts disclose no sufficient consideration therefor. Although the requirement that agreements to pay interest on interest
already due must be supported by a sufficient consideration is no doubt the
law,23 these cases are illustrative of the precarious footing on which such a
clear-cut exception to the general rule stands.
The case of Quakenbush v. Leonard2 4 presents another exception which
19. Id. at 315.
20. While this case (Van Benschooten v. Lawson) has been criticized it never has
been expressly abandoned. Thus in Stewart v. Petree, 55 N. Y. 621, 623 (1874), in sustaining a note given for interest upon the arrears of interest, the court said: "Chancellor
Kent seems to have doubted the correctness of the last proposition [validity of agreement
to pay interest on arrears of interest] and to have decided adversely to it in Van Benschooten
v. Lawson . . . , but the doctrine is too well settled by authority to be questioned in
this state; and a note given on settlement of an account, or a statement of interest past
due on an obligation, in any form, for compound interest is not usurious." However, in
the case of Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876), the decision in the Van Benschooten case
was reaffirmed and the court stated that Stewart v. Petree was decided only on the question of usury (which was held not to exist) and in no wa3T impaired the authority of
the Van Benschooten case. See note 23 infra.
21. 5 Paige 98, 103 (N. Y. 1835).
22. 63 N. Y. 631 (1875).
23. Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916). Thus,
although Young v. Hill affirmed Van Benschooten v. Lawson as noted in note 20 supra,
it was only to ". . . the extent that an agreement not made upon some new and sufficient
consideration for the payment of interest upon interest for a time already past, will not
be sustained or enforced in equity."
24. 9 Paige 334 (N. Y. 1841).
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raises provocative possibilities. The court decided that the principle of not
giving effect to a stipulation for compounding future interest did not apply
to a contract where the person who advanced the money to purchase land
for the mutual benefit of himself and others provided for a refund with compound interest out of the proceeds of the property. The court differentiated
this case on the ground that the creditor had no right to demand payment
of either principal or interest until the land was sold and that the rationale
underlying the general rule (i.e. the prevention of an accumulation of compound interest in favor of a negligent creditor) did not apply. While at first
blush such judicial construction might seem plausible, a moment's consideration will reveal its possible deleterious consequences. There is no doubt that
the judicial function in its highest form often calls for a search of the reasons
underlying rules of law so that such rules will not be applied indiscriminately.
However, certainty in the law and its stability require caution before there
is a refusal to apply a settled rule of law (especially a rule of law pertaining
to property) to the facts of a particular case. There is no objection to qualifying the application of the rule-in fact the proper use of the judicial process
requires it-where the very nature of the transaction clearly shows that the
reasons, which gave rise to the rule, do not apply. 5 However, only confusion
and instability can result where the rule as then established is abandoned on
the slightest pretext. If it is merely speculative whether or not, in the circumstances of the particular case, the agreement to pay interest on future
interest will render the creditor forgetful or negligent to the detriment of the
unwary debtor, it would be better to apply the rule until the highest court
in the exercise of its peculiar prerogative has seen fit to discard it entirely.2
Interest Coupons
While coupons representing accrued interest could appropriately be considered under the preceding subdivision, their importance and the body of
law which has developed concerning them make advisable their separate study.
Interest coupons are severable instruments attached to the usual corporate
25. See notes 15 and 16 supra, and accompanying text.
26. It is of interest to note that in the recent case of In Re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 63
F. Supp. 151 (D. Minn. 1945), the creditors proceeded on the ground that the rule invalidating agreements to pay interest on interest was not applicable to the facts in the
instant case because the debtor-railroad company was able to conduct its affairs without
the aid or benefit of the rule. Since the agreement was made in New York and was to
be performed there, the court applied the New York law and properly rejected this contention stating (at 155): "However, if this argument is sound, such an exc ption could
be applied to other corporations, large or small or even to individuals. The difference
between application and non-application of the rule would rest on a tenuous foundation,
in fact, the problem would really resolve itself into a determination of the* Debtor's
ability as a business man, rather than the determination of the ultimate facts of the case."
One may speculate that in this case the creditor, in advancing the contention, sought
some support from the generally recognized rule that usury is not a defense to a corporation (e.g. N. Y. GENERAL BusiNEss LAW § 374). However, the rule invalidating agreements to pay interest on interest does not involve any question of usury.
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bond and represent the interest then due and payable. Each coupon is, in and
of itself, an independent instrument containing an independent and distinct
promise to pay the sum due and is fully negotiable.2 7 Interest coupons, therefor, have a dual nature: in substance they are interest; in form they are
when severed from the bond, negotiable instruments2 8 The difficulty encountered by the New York Courts in harmonizing the legal consequences of the
rule under discussion as applied to such a hybrid creation is easily understandable.
From the beginning the incongruity of applying the general rule rendering
void agreements to pay interest on interest to corporate and municipal financing
arrangements has been apparent.2 9 Thus the court in Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Cleveland etc. R.R. Company3 0 denying the applicability to
corporate organizations of the principle that agreements to pay interest on
interest are void, allowed interest on the unpaid interest coupons which were
attached to certain railroad bonds. However,, such forthright abandonment
of a settled principle of law found little favor and, although never expressly
overruled, the case has been allowed to fade into oblivion. 3' Exception, rather
than complete rejection, has been the way the courts have handled the problem.
Thus the court in one of the landmark cases on this phase of the law said:
OGDEN, LAW OF NEGOT-ALE INS--iUMNTS (2d ed. 1922) 262.
28. While not strictly within the confines of our present discussion, there are many
incidental problems concerning interest coupons that commend themselves to study. Thus,
for example, the question has arisen, which party, as between a person who issued the
coupons and holder of such coupons who has failed to present them for payment after
they became due, shall bear the loss resulting from the failure of a bank in which the
funds have been deposited for the payment of the coupons? The holder of a check must
present it for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or else the drawer will be
discharged from liability to the extent of the loss caused by the delay in the event of
the drawee bank's insolvency. Sanders v. Lifsey, 41 Ga. App. 395, 153 S. E. 104 (1930);
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Keith, 97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1923). Oli the other hand, the
rule as to promissory notes in a similar case would be different, and the loss resulting
from the failure of the bank at which the instrument was payable would not fall upon
the holder of the instrument. Chapman v. Wagner, 1 Neb. 492, 96 N. W. 412 (1901). The
courts have by analogy applied the rules governing negotiable promissory notes, rather
than those governing checks, to cases involving interest coupons and have thus held that
the loss resulting from the failure of the bank at which the interest coupons were made
payable, and in which the issuer of the coupons has deposited money for their payment,
does not fall upon the holder of the coupons who has failed to present them for payment
after they became due. John K. & Catharine S. Mullen Benev. Corp. v. School Dist.,
99 Mont. 388, 43 P. (2d) 902 (1935); Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. 62
(1880); Lusk State Bank v. Lusk, 48 Wyo. 547, 52 P. (2d) 413 (1935).
29. See note 26 supra.
30. 41 Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1863).
31. It has only been cited some six times, the last time having been in the case of
Beattys v. Town of Solon, 64 Hun 127 (N. Y. 1892), in which it was heavily relied upon
to support an award of interest on interest. However, on appeal this case was subsequently

27.

modified in a memorandum opinion to exclude this award of compound interest. Beattys
v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y.'662, 32 N. E. 1062 (1893).
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"Interest, as a rule, follows the principal without becoming principal, and cannot be compounded by force merely of the contract; but that general rule
has been modified somewhat by an exception growing out of the character and
purposes of interest coupons. They may become separate and independent
instruments. When they do, the exception is for the first time needed and
for the first time applies."'' 2 So that while the general rule invalidating agreements to pay interest on interest was considered applicable to interest coupons,
it was only when they were in the hands of the holder of the bonds.33 While
a strong objection might be urged against the equity of denying a bondholder
the same rights as a mere assignee of the coupon, the logic might be conceded if the rupture were complete. But such is not the case. Thus while
an interest coupon in the hands of an assignee is a separate and independent
instrument so as to permit the accrual of interest thereon, the assignee of the
coupon is entitled to maintain an action in foreclosure to compel a sale of the
mortgaged premises, so far as might be necessary to pay the interest represented by unpaid coupons.34 This ambulatory feature of the interest coupons
defies any attempt to draw a line demarcating the respects a coupon is to be
deemed an incident of the bond and the respects in which it is to be deemed
a separate instrument 33 In Clakey v. Evansville36 a majority of the court
held that where by an endorsement upon a coupon bond a corporation guaranteed ".

.

. to the holder of the within bond the punctual payment of principal

and interest ... as then shall become due and payable," the guaranty did not
enure to the benefit of a holder of a detached coupon, since the coupon was
then a separate and independent instrument. The strong dissent in this case,
32. Williamsburg Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 481, 32 N. E.
1058 (1893), in which the court held that interest could not be collected on past due
interest coupons since the coupons were in the hands of the original owners. Inferentially,
therefore, the court indicated that had they been detached and owned by an assignee
interest would have been allowed. Inasmuch as there was no covenant to pay interest on
interest in the trust indenture securing the bonds, or on the face of either the bonds or
the coupons, it appears that not only does New York allow agreements to pay interest
on interest coupons which have been detached and are in the hands of an assignee but
it goes to the extent of implying such an agreement where there is no provision therefor.
In Re American Fuel and Power Co. el al., 151 F. (2d) 470, 478 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
For a cogent discussion of interest as damages for the non-payment of interest see
1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) § 345 et seq. See also for a tersely written defense
of the right to ir terest as damages for the non-payment of interest due by contract,
(1922) 8 VA. L. REV. 388.
33. Bailey v. Buchanan, 115 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. 155 (1889).
34. Long Island Loan & Trust Co. v. Long Island City, 85 App. Div. 36, 82 N. Y.
Supp. 644 (2d Dept. 1903), aff'd, 178 N. Y. 588, 70 N. E. 1002 (1904).
35. It would appear that although the coupons have not been detached, the statute
of limitations runs upon them separately at the date of the maturity of the coupons.
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 2024. For a rather concise treatment of this
problem see (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 823.
36. 16 App. Div. 304, 44 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dept. 1897).
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concurred in by at least one text-book writer,3 7 accentuates further the unsatisfactory state of the law with regard to this question. There is no doubt
that, while a detached coupon becomes a separate and independent instrument,
a nexus to the original bond remains. How strong a nexus? When does it
control? The unsettled state of the law makes any ansvers to these problems
at best highly speculative. Thus we might ask: if the coupon is separated from
the bond and negotiated and then finally re-negotiated back to the original
bond owner, would such coupon draw interest? While it might well appear
that the coupon's subsequent negotiations had reinforced its independent character as a separate 3nd distinct instrument and thus entitled its owner, whoever he might be, to interest thereon, such does not appear to be the case. In
Klein v. East River Electric Light Co. s it was held that where the plaintiff,
who was the holder of interest coupons of certain bonds, did not show whether
or not he was the owner of the bonds to which the coupons were originally
attached, nor the time when they were detached, nor whether he became
owner before or after detachment, he could not recover interest, since so long
as the coupons are held by the owner of the bond interest follows principal
and cannot be compounded. A literal reading of this decision would also
indicate that a condition precedent to even a stranger obtaining the right to
interest on an interest coupon would be the detachment of the coupon from
the bond prior to his ownership of it. While this latter conclusion might appear
to be tenuous and strained, in the light of the previous decisions, it would be
foolhardy emphatically to reject it.
The history of a recent New York case may shed some light on the present
attitude of the New York courts towards this outmoded doctrine. In In Re
Schzster's Will,39 the decedent's will had given a life estate to his widow. In
a prior decision construing this will the Surrogate's Court had held that a
power of sale contained in the will was imperative and, had resulted in a conversion of the realty into personalty as of the date of his death. It had,
therefore, been held that the real property should haVe been sold by the
executrices one year after the date of the issuance of letters testamentary and
thus they were surcharged four per cent interest on the value of the realty
from the date of the testator's death to the date of the widow's death.40 The
question in this case was whether the Surrogate should allow interest on such
surcharge. The Surrogate denied the request for interest on the express ground
that ".

.

. it is well settled in this state that in the absence of an express

contract or statutory authority, compound interest is not allowed." 41 Upon
appeal, the Appellate Division modified the decree of the Surrogate without
37. 2 MACHEN, MODERN LAw OF CoRaoRATioNs (1908) § 1776, in which the author
commenting on this decision said: "It is submitted, however, that this conclusion is very
narrow and defeats the real intention of the parties, and that the opinion of the dissenting
judge contains the preferable reasoning."
38. 33 Misc. 596, 67 N. Y. Supp. 922 (App. Term 1901).
39. 167 Misc. 194, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 702 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
40. In Re Schuster's Will, 150 Misc. 444, 269 N. Y. Supp. 546 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
41.

167 Misc. at 195, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) at 704.
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even considering the general rule invalidating compound interest which was
alluded to and relied on in the Surrogate's court. The Appellate Division
appeared to place its decision on the broad generalization that "... more
and more courts are coming to the view, that in actions on implied contract
to recover for services or property, interest is a concomitant, very nearly
automatic. . . . Interest is now held to be an incident to just compensation. ... ." This decision
was affirmed in a memorandum opinion by the New
43
York Court of Appeals.
Conclusion
It is hoped that the last cited decision is indicative of a realization on the
part of the New York courts that the rule invalidating agreements to pay
interest on interest is archaic and not compatible with the needs of an industrialized and commercialized society in which creditors and debtors either are,
or should be, wide-awake to their obligations. Possibly the New York Court
of Appeals may in the future, making use of its judicial prerogative, discard
the old rule, which has been found to have served "another generation badly."
Such action could not justifiably be condemned as judicial legislation when
we consider the unplausible and weak foundation upon which the existing
rule is based. In that event-the Court might well reaffirm, and quote with
approval, the language employed by another Court when called on to determine as a case of first impression this precise question: ". . . we think the
rule allowing interest, is upon the whole, better grounded in the principles and
analogies of the law and more consonant with the modern ideas in regard to
' 44
interest as exhibited both in jurisprudence and legislation.
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